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I British Corps and the Battle of
the Scheldt
A Reassessment
NICHOLAS WHEELER
Abstract : This paper will demonstrate that I British Corps’ operations
were critical to the opening of the port of Antwerp. By examining the
impact that I British Corps had on the operational and strategic levels of
command within Twenty-First Army Group, it challenges the narrative
that their operations were supporting in nature. Anchoring the centre
of a three corps operation designed to open the port of Antwerp, clear
the Scheldt Estuary, and push German forces out of southern Holland,
I British Corps faced the bulk of Fifteenth Army and was decisive in
undermining its strategic concept of operations. In fact, I British Corps’
actions ensured the operational success of 2nd Canadian Division and
the strategic success of First Canadian Army and Twenty-First Army
Group.

T

is well known within Canadian
military history. II Canadian Corps, under the temporary
command of Major-General Charles Foulkes, fought a bloody battle in
the Breskens Pocket, South Beveland, and Walcheren Island between
September and November 1944. Firsthand accounts of the battle, war
diaries, and official reports describe horrific conditions, a determined
German enemy, and appalling numbers of casualties. In this respect,
II Canadian Corps’ story dominates the historiography of the Scheldt
and Antwerp. There is, however, another aspect of this story that has
long been neglected. Lieutenant-General Sir John Crocker’s I British
Corps played an important role in the Battle of the Scheldt.
I British Corps, a multi-national formation composed of divisions
from Canada, Britain, the United States, and Poland, anchored the
he battle of the scheldt
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right wing of First Canadian Army. From this position, Crocker
was tasked with opening Antwerp and protecting the left flank of
Second British Army as it continued its push towards Germany. The
Corps’ operations were profoundly influenced by the ongoing strategic
debate between the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight
Eisenhower, who favoured a broad-front advance into Germany,
and the Commander of Twenty-First Army Group, Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery, who advocated a narrow thrust. The resulting
ambiguity in directives to Crocker put him in a unique position to
have a considerable influence on the operational and strategic outcome
of the Battle of the Scheldt. A re-examination of the primary and
secondary sources indicates that I British Corps played a much larger
role in the opening of Antwerp and the defeat of Fifteenth Army than
previously recognized.
This paper will demonstrate that I British Corps’ operations
were critical to the success of Allied operations to open the port of
Antwerp. A reassessment of I British Corps’ operations challenges
the marginalized nature of its role in the battle. In exploring the
relationship between I and XII British Corps, this paper will
dissect Montgomery’s 16 October directive and examine how his
strategic direction should have translated into operational action in
contrast to how operations unfolded. By assessing this strategic and
operational disconnect, and the influence Montgomery had on XII
British Corps’ operations, it will demonstrate that I British Corps
assumed a much larger operational and strategic role in the battle
than previously recognized.
This paper also assesses the impact of I British Corps’ operations
in relation to 2nd Canadian Division’s efforts to isolate the South
Beveland isthmus. Initially, this analysis will focus on the strategic
direction issued by Montgomery prior to 16 October, arguing that
the continued disconnect between Montgomery’s strategic direction
and intent prevented 2nd Canadian Division from accomplishing the
operational task of securing the South Beveland isthmus. As a result,
First Canadian Army was unable to clear the Scheldt Estuary. It will
then examine the relationship between 2nd Canadian Division and I
British Corps post-16 October. Crocker’s efforts to secure the northern
and eastern flanks of 2nd Canadian Division subsequently resulted in
the isolation of the South Beveland isthmus and the operational and
strategic successes of First Canadian Army and Twenty-First Army
Group.
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Lieutenant General J. T. Crocker, commander of I British Corps. [© IWM (TR 2169)]

While the Battle of the Scheldt has a lengthy historiography,
I British Corps’ operations during the Scheldt campaign are
neglected within the literature. One would assume that the analysis
of a strategically critical battle such as the opening of the port of
Antwerp would be comprehensive. However, several factors have
led to I British Corps’ role in this operation being marginalized or
misunderstood. This in turn has led to an inaccurate assessment of
the importance of the Corps during this period. In fact, the narrative
surrounding I British Corps operations has evolved from early
assessments of their extreme importance, to a later characterization
as only supporting in nature.
Why has I British Corps role in the opening of Antwerp been
downgraded and, more generally, neglected? The earliest accounts
of the Battle of the Scheldt consist of Twenty-First Army Group’s
report completed shortly after the end of the war in Europe and
two Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) reports compiled in
1946 and 1948. These three reports provide little with respect to I
British Corps’ operations, and primarily focus on the overarching
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strategic situation and II Canadian Corps’ operations.1 In the case
of the CMHQ report, the author, W.E.C. Harrison, was likely trying
to provide a general overview of the Scheldt operation to be included
within C.P. Stacey’s, official historian of the Canadian Army,
forthcoming official history instead of a comprehensive account of the
battle. While Harrison does describe I British Corps’ operations as
“extremely important,” the text is mostly descriptive in nature, with
the role of I British Corps being peripheral to the main focus of the
work—II Canadian Corps.
The focus on the Canadian narrative continued in Stacey’s the
Victory Campaign in 1960. The production of the three-volume
Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War
was constrained by a desire to publish them shortly after the end of
the conflict and in a format that appealed to the general reader.2 As
a result, Stacey only briefly recounts the story of I British Corps.
Operations from 16 to 29 October are related in a single paragraph
while those between 30 October and 8 November are restricted to
half a page.3 A likely explanation for I British Corps’ operations being
largely overlooked is that they simply did not meet the requirements
outlined by Stacey for their incorporation into the official history.4
It is not surprising then, that a multi-national British Corps, in the
“Cinderella Army” of Twenty-First Army Group, did not receive more
attention within a Canadian official history. Considering Stacey’s
intent, a microscopic focus on a British Corps fighting with the First
Canadian Army would have seemed out of place.

21st Army Group, Clearing of the Scheldt Estuary: Oct-Nov 1944, 1944,
Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, 3. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/
cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/2615/rec/2 accessed 18 July 2017.; W.E.C.
Harrison, CMHQ Report #154: Clearing the Scheldt Estuary and Opening the Port
of Antwerp: Operations of First Canadian Army in NorthWest Europe, 1 Oct. - 8
Nov. 44 (Preliminary Report), May 5, 1946, Directorate of History and Heritage
(DHH), 5-7; W.E.C. Harrison, CMHQ Report #188: Canadian Participation in the
Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part VI: Canadian Operation, 1 Oct. - 8
Nov. The Clearing of the Scheldt Estuary, April 7, 1948, DHH, 88.
2  
Roger Sarty, “The Origins of Academic Military History in Canada, 1940-1967,”
Canadian Military History 23, 2 (2015): 8,10.
3  
Charles Perry Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second
World War, Vol. III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe
1944-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 390,
424.
4  
Ibid., xiii.
1  
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Stacey’s limited account of I British Corps has had unintended
consequences on the scholarly examination of First Canadian Army
operations during October and November 1944. British, American,
and German official histories pay little attention to I British Corps
in favour of more strategically important operations. Consequently, I
British Corps is perceived as something distant and peripheral to the
Scheldt campaign. Since Stacey’s official histories were considered
the definitive account of the Canadian Army during the Second World
War until as late as the 1980s, the academic analysis of I British
Corps during this period is very limited.5 Copp’s analysis of I British
Corps in relation to Twenty-First Army Group can be considered the
only academic work that has been written on this subject to date.6
Unfortunately, the absence of academic analysis has allowed memoirs
and popular histories to define I British Corps’ role in the battle.
Depending on the source, either a British or Canadian narrative
is ever present throughout memoirs and popular histories. From a
Canadian perspective, excellent examples are the works of Denis
Whitaker and Mark Zuehlke. II Canadian Corps is at the forefront of
their narratives of the Battle of the Scheldt while I British Corps and its
units are relegated to a secondary role. The works of R.W. Thompson
and J.L. Moulton insert a British narrative into the battle, but not to
the benefit of I British Corps. Their accounts focus on the participation
of other British units, examining operations within the Scheldt proper,
with only a cursory analysis of I British Corps’ operations.
The consistent reduction of I British Corps within the literature
has generated the belief that Crocker’s forces played nothing more
than a supporting role. Douglas Delaney has argued, “Large and
successful though the operation may have been, it was still only a
supporting action to protect the right flank of the First Canadian
Army as it struggled to clear the Scheldt Estuary.”7 Harrison would
have likely been surprised at this evaluation of I British Corps’ role
in operations north of Antwerp.
The reality is that I British Corps played a significant part in
the strategic and operational success of Twenty-First Army Group.
5  
Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World
Wars (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2016), 162.
6  
Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944-1945
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 122-173.
7  
Douglas Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at
War, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 167.
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Anchored in the centre of Montgomery’s three-corps operation, I British
Corps faced the bulk of the German Fifteenth Army commanded by
Gustav von Zangen. From this central position, Crocker was in a
unique position to determine the operational success of II Canadian
Corps and the strategic success of Twenty-First Army Group. As I
British Corps began operations to clear German forces south of the
River Maas, the lack of a clear operational plan by Montgomery
forced I British Corps to take the leading role in the defeat of
Fifteenth Army. The existential threat posed by Crocker’s formation
forced Fifteenth Army to reinforce LXVII Corps at the expense of
LXXXVIII Corps, facilitating XII British Corps operations. Further,
I British Corps fixed the majority of Fifteenth Army within its area of
operations, which in turn lessened the burden on II Canadian Corps
and XII British Corps. In this respect, 2nd Canadian Division relied
heavily on I British Corps in its efforts to isolate the South Beveland
isthmus. Without the advance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division
and 49th West Riding (WR) Division on their eastern flank, the
clearance of the Scheldt Estuary would have inevitably been delayed,
causing a host of operational and strategic issues. Regardless of the

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/20
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position I British Corps occupies from a historiographical perspective,
Crocker’s forces played a decisive role in the operational and strategic
success of Twenty-First Army Group in October and November 1944.
Crocker arrived north of Antwerp on 23 September and quickly
found himself torn by operational and strategic priorities. The intent
was for II Canadian Corps to focus on operations in the Scheldt
Estuary while I British Corps cleared German forces between
II Canadian Corps and XII British Corps. The reality was much
different. Between 27 September to 16 October, Crocker focused
primarily on securing Second British Army’s left flank, using 49th
(WR) Division and 1st Polish Armoured Division, as the commander
of Second British Army, Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey
attempted to break into the Ruhr. Given the enormity of this task,
Crocker lacked sufficient forces to support 2nd Canadian Division’s
attack towards the South Beveland Isthmus. So, while Crocker was
explicitly directed to support II Canadian Corps, Montgomery’s
overarching strategic imperative prevented him from accomplishing
this task.8 In the end, I British Corps’ advance quickly ground to
a halt as Crocker had insufficient combat power to overcome the
German defensive positions or maintain a solid frontline.9
With the culmination of the strategic debate between Eisenhower
and Montgomery, the directive issued on 16 October to Twenty-First
Army Group should have eliminated any strategic dissonance that
8  
I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 16, 9 October 1944, Department of
National Defence (DND) Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 10 790, Library and Archives
Canada (LAC); Letter to Lieutenant General Crocker from Field Marshall
Montgomery, 28 September 1944, John Crocker Personal Papers. John Crocker
Personal Papers, Letter to George Crocker from Lieutenant General Crocker, 9
December 1944, page 1. In the letter to Crocker, Montgomery emphasized that
the “right wing of the (First Canadian) Army must ‘drive’ hard northwards on the
axis Tilburg-Hertogenbosch.” He further indicated, “Breda, and places that way
(presumably Roosendaal), do not matter.” Developing operations northwards
towards the Maas, excluding the advance on Tilburg-Hertogenbosch were obviously
inconsequential to Montgomery, including any kind of flank support to 2nd Canadian
Division. Additionally, in his letter to his brother, Crocker recounted that after
receiving the letter, “…I was sent for by Montgomery, who told me what he wanted.”
Montgomery clearly articulated to Crocker that advance of Second British Army
were the main effort of Twenty-First Army Group.
9  
Letter from Lieutenant General Crocker to George Crocker, 9 December 1944, John
Crocker Personal Papers. In Crocker’s assessment of the situation to his brother, as
49th (WR) Division established bridgeheads over the Antwerp-Turnhout canal, the
remainder of I British Corps “… followed up at once, ridiculously thin on the ground
and still without most of my artillery, tanks, etc…”
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existed. On the surface, Montgomery’s orders to First Canadian
Army and Second British Army appeared to reorient Twenty-First
Army Group’s priorities towards Antwerp. While First Canadian
Army accelerated operations in the Scheldt with II Canadian Corps,
Montgomery tasked I and XII British Corps to isolate and destroy
Fifteenth Army south of the Maas. Montgomery’s directive suggests
this took the form of a three-phase operation. In phase one, I British
Corps, on the right flank of First Canadian Army, would advance
towards Roosendaal/Bergen Op Zoom on 20 October in support
of 2nd Canadian Division’s efforts to isolate the South Beveland
isthmus. Composed of two mutually supporting operations, Operation
Suitcase would be executed by the recently attached 4th Canadian
Armoured Division, while Clarke Force executed Operation Rebound.10
Previously, the inter-army boundary of 8 October and the extant task
of protecting Dempsey’s left flank had prevented any intimate support
from I British Corps. However, Montgomery’s directive shifted this
boundary west, allowing the II Canadian Corps and I British Corps
boundary to shift accordingly.11 By reducing I British Corps’ area
of responsibility and attaching 4th Canadian Armoured Division, it
permitted Crocker to focus his combat power on a decisive thrust
north along 2nd Canadian Division’s eastern flank.
Concurrently, Montgomery directed Second British Army to shut
down all offensive operations not designed to open the port. Operation
Pheasant consisted of a reinforced XII Corps attacking west towards
‘s-Hertogenbosch and Breda on an axis of advance centered on
Poppel/Breda/Moerdijk. Theoretically, the forty-eight hour delay
between the two operations suggests that I British Corps would fix
German forces south of the Maas, while XII British Corps conducted
a wide-sweeping flank attack to trap and isolate the majority of
Fifteenth Army in southern Holland.12 Phase three, the destruction of
Fifteenth Army, would then be executed concurrently by both I and
XII British Corps. Strategically, the end state envisioned Antwerp

49th (WR) Division Operation Instruction 55 (Operation REBOUND), 17 October
1944, First Canadian Army, General Staff, October 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17,
volume 13628, LAC; 4th Canadian Armoured Division Operation Instruction 11 (Op
SUITCASE), 17 October 1944, 4th Canadian Armoured Division, General Staff War
Diary, September-October 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C3, volume 13788, LAC
11  
I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 17, 17 October 1944, DND Fonds,
RG24, C17, volume 10 790, LAC.
12  
Harrison, CMHQ Report #188, DHH, 90.
10  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/20

8

Wheeler: I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
WHEELER

9

open, Fifteenth Army destroyed south of the Maas, the redeployment
of the majority of Twenty-First Army Group’s combat power east,
and the effective resupply of Allied forces outlined in Eisenhower’s
broad front strategy.
Of course this plan was conceptual in nature and does not
accurately portray the reality or complexity of the situation. In
order to truly understand the strategic importance of I British
Corps’ operations to Twenty-First Army Group, it is necessary to
examine the role Crocker’s forces and XII British Corps played in the
offensive. A close examination of Montgomery’s 16 October directive
and the orders issued by both I and XII British Corps suggests an
uncoordinated and underdeveloped concept of operations.
Crocker issued Operation Instruction Number 17 the formation
on 17 October 1944. The tasks outlined in the order marked a key
shift in previous assigned tasks in Operation Instruction Number
16. While I British Corps retained responsibly for protecting the
right flank of 2nd Canadian Division, the previously assigned task of
clearing the Germans south of the Maas is absent.13 Considering the
direction that Montgomery provided on 16 October, this is a curious
omission and suggests that Montgomery had not fully developed
a comprehensive plan to this point. Realistically, with 1st Polish
Armoured Division and supporting forces fixed in Alphen since 5
October, and 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke Force
directed to clear 2nd Canadian Division’s eastern and northern
flanks, Crocker did not have additional forces to attack north and fix
LXVII Corps as outlined in Montgomery’s directive.
It was not until 23 October, when 104th (US) Infantry Division
came into the I British Corps’ line, that Crocker executed a fourup division attack against German forces south of the Maas. The
Division, commanded by Major-General Terry Allen, arrived twentyfour hours after I British Corps should have fixed LXVII Corps and
XII British Corps began operations to cut the lines of communication
over the Maas. This indicates a significant lack of synchronization
I British Corps, Operation Instruction No. 16 and 17, LAC. Operation Instruction
No. 16 identifies that I British Corps was tasked “To protect directly the right
flank 2 Cdn Inf Div whilst it is undertaking offensive ops westwards from the area
WOENSDRECH [sic] 6020 against SUID BEVELAND” and “To clear enemy at
present SOUTH of R Maas.” Within Operation Instruction No. 17, I British Corps
is only tasked “To prevent the enemy interfering with 2 Cdn Inf Div during its ops
to capture SUID BEVELAND.”

13  
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between phase one and two of Montgomery’s concept of operations.
In execution, as 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke Force
advanced northwest, a single brigade from the 49th (WR) Division
occupied the centre of the Corps’ front. Without a coordinated
advance north in cooperation with XII Corps’ attack east, a gap
would open between First Canadian Army and Second British Army,
which in theory could have been exploited by LXVII Corps.
Evidence indicates that Crocker and his division commanders
were unaware of Montgomery’s plan for a joint operation between
I and XII British Corps. It was not until 21 October, six days
after Montgomery’s directive, that Crocker discussed the concept of
a coordinated action to trap Fifteenth Army in southern Holland
with 4th Canadian Armoured Division.14 Similarly, 104th (US)
Infantry Division did not receive clear direction until 23 October
when Montgomery personally briefed the division’s senior officers.15
While Allen’s division did not come onto the line until this date, he
had met previously with the First Canadian Army Headquarters
staff on 18 October and with Simonds and the Chief of Staff on 20
October to discuss 104th (US) Infantry Division’s upcoming role in
operations.16 Had a comprehensive strategy existed at this point,
there would have been no requirement for Montgomery to brief Allen’s
division. This suggests that Crocker and his division commanders
began operations prior to the development of a coordinated I and
XII British Corps plan.
Montgomery’s plan also lack clarity with regards to the role
of XII British Corps during phase two of the operation. In Second
British Army tasks, he directed Dempsey to attack towards Moerdijk
with a view to “cutting the communication routes over the Meuse
[Maas] of all enemy troops south of the river.”17 This implies that
Montgomery wanted to isolate the majority of Fifteenth Army within
southern Holland so that XII British Corps could act as the anvil

4th Canadian Armoured Division, General Staff War Diary, September-October
1944, War Diary, 21 October 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C3, volume 1788, LAC. First
Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, July-October 1944, War Diary, 20 October
1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, volume 13607, LAC.
15  
Gerald Astor, Terrible Terry Allen (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 255.
16  
First Canadian Army, G Plans War Diary, War Diary, 18 and 20 October 1944,
LAC.
17  
Field Marshal Montgomery’s Directive, 16 October 1944, cited in Stacey, The
Victory Campaign, 655.
14  
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to I British Corps’ hammer. However, XII British Corps’ direction
to its formations lacks any mention of this concept. XII British
Corps’ Operation Instruction number 17 sets a limit of exploitation
at Geertruidenberg, identifying the attack to Moerdijk as only a
possible future task..18 Clearly, this concept of operation would not
achieve the desired effect outlined by Montgomery in his 16 October
directive. However, given his predilection to provide direction to
corps commanders, it is likely that XII British Corps issued these
orders with Montgomery’s blessing. XII British Corps also issued the
order on 20 October, which explains why I British Corps had not
planned for a coordinated operation. In conjunction with the obvious
issues with the direction issued to I British Corps, it suggests that
Montgomery did not have a concrete idea of what he wanted to do
south of the Maas, besides opening Antwerp as quickly as possible to
reorient his forces east. Without the successful execution of the first
XII British Corps Operation Instruction number 17 (Operation PHEASANT),
20 October 1944, First Canadian Army, General Staff, October 1944, DND Fonds,
RG24, C17, volume 13628, LAC.

18  
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two phases, Fifteenth Army retained sufficient withdrawal routes and
crossing sites, rendering Montgomery’s overall objective of destroying
von Zangen’s forces impossible.
As I British Corps began Operations Suitcase and Rebound,
it faced LXVII Corps, composed of 85th Division, which had been
redeployed from LXXXVIII Corps to counter the threat of the 2nd
Canadian Division at the South Beveland isthmus, the 346th Division,
the 711th Division, and the 719th Division. First to cross the line
of departure, 4th Canadian Armoured Division advanced along 2nd
Canadian Division’s flank towards Esschen and Bergen Op Zoom,
while Clarke Force provided flank security by attacking Wuestwezel.
Such was the threat posed to the integrity of LXVII Corps’ defensive
line by the advance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke
Force’s defeat of 711th Division at Wuestwezel, that it precipitated
the redeployment of 245th Division to LXVII Corps.19 Initially,
von Zangen intended to reinforce 85th Division in the Woensdrecht
Elmar Warning, Battles of 67 German Corps between Scheldt and Maas, 15
September-25 November 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, 20 523, LAC, 33-34.

19  
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area against 2nd Canadian Division and to stop the advance of 4th
Canadian Armoured Division, which followed the overall concept
of operations for Fifteenth Army. Von Zangen understood that he
lacked sufficient forces after the retreat from France to maintain
a continuous defensive line from the South Beveland isthmus to
‘s-Hertogenbosch. To compensate for this, he redeployed divisions,
battle groups, and other combat enablers to points threatened by
Allied operations and then redeployed them to other hot spots as
required.20 However, Otto Sponheimer, Commander LXVII Corps,
believed that Clarke Force’s success at Wuestwezel threatened to split
the corps in half and potentially collapse Fifteenth Army’s front.21
Regardless of 85th Division’s desperate need for reinforcements, the
actions of I British Corps altered the priorities of Fifteenth Army.
The immediate requirement for 245th Division’s transfer east had
a two-fold effect. First, it limited Fifteenth Army’s ability to hold
the South Beveland isthmus. As 4th Canadian Armoured Division
advanced northwards along 2nd Canadian Division’s extended flank, it
represented an existential threat to von Zangen’s influence over South
Beveland isthmus, while at the same time Clarke Force threatened
the integrity of Fifteenth Army’s front. Essentially, Crocker left von
Zangen two choices: maintain pressure on 2nd Canadian Division and
risk the destruction of Fifteenth Army, or surrender the isthmus to
First Canadian Army and temporarily stave off defeat. Both courses
of action had obvious strategic consequences. Second, the defeat of
the 245th Division by Clarke Force and its subsequent withdrawal
northeast to Zundert, maginified the threat to Fifteenth Army. In the
face of the mounting casualties taken by 85th and 346th Division,
the inability to provide reinforcements in the Woensdrecht area, and
the continued advance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, von
Zangen felt he had no choice but to conduct a withdrawal along the
entire Fifteenth Army front. On 23 October, Sponheimer indicated,
“Now a withdrawal of the whole front had to be carried out, come
what might, regardless of OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)
orders, if the whole corps was not to be sacrificed and the way to
the Maas left open to the enemy. As a result of the Corps’ strong
insistence, permission was given for the whole front to be withdrawn
to the general line of Halsteren (north of Bergen Op Zoom)/South
Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 46.
Warning, Battles of 67 German Corps, 33-34.

20  
21  
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Roosendaal/South Breda/Alphen North.”22 With this withdrawal, I
British Corps forced Fifteenth Army to abandon their attempts to
retain some measure of influence on the South Beveland isthmus.
Crocker’s execution of phase one achieved an important victory
when it forced Fifteenth Army to abandon control of the isthmus.
However, the decision by von Zangen to withdraw LXVII Corps to a
new defensive line between 23 to 24 October also had a considerable
impact on the evolution of Montgomery’s concept of operations.
While I British Corps was supposed to fix LXVII Corps, their
initial success forced the Germans to withdraw almost 20 km north
in some areas; effectively shortening their main defensive line and
reducing their area of operation by half. This seems to have left
Montgomery with two choices: maintain phase two as outlined in
his 16 October directive with LXVII Corps much closer to the Maas
than anticipated, or adjust the concept of operations for XII British
Corps. Montgomery chose the latter and decided to reduce XII
British Corps’ limit of exploitation to just west of Raamsdonkveer,
17 km from its original objective of Moerdijk. Although this decision
may seem like a legitimate tactical decision, evidence suggests that
Montgomery’s commitment to a determined thrust by XII British
Corps to isolate Fifteenth Army was marginal at best.
XII British Corps’ operations seem to confirm Montgomery’s
lack of commitment to the destruction of Fifteenth Army. XII
British Corps consisted of, running northeast to southwest, 53rd
(W) Division, 7th British Armoured Division, 51st (H) Division, and
15th (S) Division. Supporting this attack were 33rd Tank Brigade,
6th Guards Tank Brigade, and 4th Armoured Brigade. Considering
they faced three understrength divisions, XII British Corps held a
considerable advantage against LXXXVIII Corps. The initial stages
of Operation Pheasant indicate a staggered assault. 53rd (W) Division
and 7th British Armoured Division began their advance towards
‘s-Hertogenbosch in the early morning of 22 October. Two days later,
51st (H) Division attacked northwest with a general axis of advance
west of ‘s-Hertogenbosch while 15th (S) Division struck out towards
Tilburg. By this time, I British Corps had already precipitated LXVII
Corps withdrawal to their new defensive line.
As XII British Corps continued its advance, 51st (H) Division
attacked northwest towards ‘s−Hertogenbosch on 25 October, while
Ibid. 34.

22  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/20

14

Wheeler: I British Corps and the Battle of the Scheldt
WHEELER

15

7th Armoured Division consolidated behind their lines and then
advanced west towards Loon Op Zoom, capturing Udenhout on 27
October. On the same day, 15th (S) Division and 6th Guards Tank
Brigade cleared Tilburg and were subsequently withdrawn from the
line the following day to counter a German offensive in the Venlo
area. By this time, German resistance stiffened along the entire XII
British Corps front.
Allied intelligence and reconnaissance reports indicated that
LXXXVIII Corps intended to retreat to bridgeheads over the Maas.
In conjunction with this withdrawal, they established a defensive line
from Dongen to the Afwaterings Canal on 24 October, which tied into
LXVII Corps position. Beyond this line, LXXXVIII Corps controlled
crossing sites at Raamsdonkveer, Huesden, and Hedel where German
forces either crossed by bridge or makeshift ferries. In an effort to
reduce these bridgeheads, 53rd (W) Division advanced north from
‘s-Hertogenbosch while 51st (H) and 7th British Armoured Division,
through combined efforts, attacked the bridgeheads at Raamsdonkveer
and Huesden. While successful, LXXXVIII Corps managed to hold
these bridgeheads until 5 November, effectively preventing any further
advance westwards by XII British Corps.
To this effect, Terry Copp’s argument that Montgomery
demonstrated marginal commitment to XII British Corps’ advance
west in support of First Canadian Army’s operations merits
investigation.23 An examination of the message logs between I British
Corps and XII British Corps develops a common theme—a painfully
slow advance west by XII British Corps towards Moerdijk. Situation
reports indicate that until 28 October, LXXXVIII Corps put up
minimal resistance, with a few exceptions in Middelrode against
7th British Armoured Division and house-to-house fighting in
‘s-Hertogenbosch against 53rd (W) Division. The Germans primarily
relied on delaying operations, including obstacles, mines, and bridge
demolition to slow the British advance. Operations such as this
represented the only viable course of action for LXXXVIII Corps at
the time. Had they tried to effect a standard defensive line in their
weakened state, they likely would have been overrun.
When XII British Corps attacked on 22 October, LXXXVIII
Corps only had 59th Division and a much reduced 712th Division to
hold the front. Its remaining division, the 245th had redeployed east
Copp, Cinderella Army, 157.
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to counter the advance of I British Corps. To reinforce the German
corps, 256th Volksgrenadier Division began arriving piecemeal from
Germany beginning the night of 19 to 20 October and only established
a defensive line from Dongden/Loon Op Zand/Vught on 25 October.
This explains why XII British Corps reported a stiffening of German
resistance between 28 to 30 October, as lead elements of 51st (H)
Division and 7th British Armoured Division came into contact with
256th Volksgrenadier Division at this time.24 That being said, by
24 October, 712th Division had effectively been destroyed by the
53rd (W) Division in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, forcing 59th Division to
absorb their responsibilities on the front.25 A decisive strike through
59th Division may have allowed XII British Corps to overrun 256th
Volksgrenadier Division as it attempted to establish its defensive line.
Why did XII British Corps have such a difficult time against
a vastly inferior force? The important element to be gleaned from
the situation reports and message logs is that XII British Corps
seemed content to methodically push the Germans out of southern
Holland rather than trap Fifteenth Army south of the Maas.
Montgomery opted for his standard set-piece attack to reduce and
attrite LXXXVIII Corps, contrary to what he outlined as his phase
two objective—cutting the lines of communication over the Maas at
Moerdijk. Despite pushing elements of von Zangen’s forces north of
the Maas, it failed to achieve his purported strategic end state—the
destruction of Fifteenth Army.
Post-war reporting from LXXXVIII Corps reflects this fact.
According to General H.W. Reinhard, commander of LXXXVIII
Corps, XII British Corps could have rolled up the entire Corps front
at St. Michels-Gestel and Esch had they maintained continuous
pressure on 59th Division during the initial stages of Operation
Pheasant.26 Considering XII British Corps attacked this section of
LXXXVIII Corps’ defensive line with two infantry divisions, an
armoured division, and two independent tank brigades, the destruction
of this overstretched and weakened division should have been easily
achievable. Although Reinhard does concede that XII British Corps

1 British Corps, War Diary and Message Logs, October-November 1944, Message
Logs, 280415October1944 and 300340October1944, DHH, Kardex, 79.681, Reel 4.
25  
Steiger, AHQ Report #69, 54.
26  
H.W. Reinhard, 88 German Corps Commitment from Albert Canal to the Lower
Maas - 5 September-21 December 1944, DND Fonds, RG24, C17, 20 523, LAC, 18.
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pressed the Germans as they moved north, he also argues that the
pressure was not so determined to prevent an orderly withdrawal
by LXXXVIII Corps’ formations.27 As the corps and division
headquarters, along with the vast majority of the Corps’ artillery
and enablers, withdrew across the Maas intact and supported the
infantry division’s withdrawal through the bridgeheads, Reinhard’s
assessment of XII British Corps’ slow advance has merit.28 The
slow advance of the British allowed 256th Volksgrenadier Division
to establish a long defensive line, which prevented any significant
penetration north. This enabled LXXXVIII Corps to maintain
bridgeheads at Raamsdonkveer until 1 November, Huesden until 5
November, and Hedel held until 7 or 8 November. The fact that XII
British Corps did not capture a bridge intact is also indicative of
Reinhard’s claim of a controlled withdrawal of German forces. Even
though LXXXVIII Corps did manage to withdraw north across the
Maas, it did not escape unscathed. XII British Corps inflicted heavy
casualties and left LXXXVIII Corps considerably weakened, if not
combat ineffective.29 Nevertheless, reporting from both German and
British forces seems to indicate that XII British Corps failed to take
advantage of a weakened enemy.30
Another indication of Montgomery’s strategic fixation to the east
was the transfer of units from XII British Corps to VIII British
Corps prior to clearing all German forces from south of the Maas.
15th (S) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade completed operations
on the south-western flank of XII British Corps in Tilburg on 27
October. The previous day, in an effort to draw the Allies away from
the Maas and lessen the burden on Fifteenth Army, von Rundstedt
directed the execution of a spoiling attack in the Venlo area against
Twenty-First Army Group’s eastern flank. Under specific direction
from Montgomery to counter the threat to VIII British Corps, the
two formations were redirected east to stem the advance of German
forces on 28 October. Were they actually required though? Charles
MacDonald indicates that by 28 October, 7th (US) Armored Division,
under VIII British Corps, had stopped the German offensive in
cooperation with a significant Allied air offensive. While likely

Reinhard, 88 German Corps, 22-23.
Ibid., 22-24.
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unknown to Montgomery or Dempsey, the actions of the Americans
convinced von Rundstedt that there was little to gain from continued
offensive operations and he cancelled subsequent efforts.31 So, by the
time that 15th (S) Division and the 6th Guards Tank Bridge began
their movement to Venlo, VIII British Corps’ front had stabilized
and the crisis averted. In the end, British reinforcements assisted
with the restoration of the previous gains of VIII Corps.
MacDonald also makes a seemingly innocuous statement that the
transfer of the two formations made little difference to XII British
Corps’ operations as they had already completed their assigned tasks
in the offensive to open Antwerp.32 Yet Montgomery’s 16 October
directive clearly stated, “The whole of the available offensive power
of Second Army will now be brought to bear (on Antwerp)….”33 From
this, it can be reasoned that 15th (S) Division and the 6th Guards
Tank Bridge had a limited objective of Tilburg, potentially without
subsequent assigned tasks. Similarly, A.G. Steiger argues that by
29 October, “…the current crisis of Fifteenth Army had passed its
climax, the battle was lost and any withdrawals of Allied forces from
that front at this late stage would be of scant significance.”34 Both
assessments are derived from a misunderstanding of the situation
within southern Holland and the impact these two units could have
had on operations. Despite the fact that they captured Tilburg, XII
British Corps struggled to reduce German bridgeheads over the Maas
into the first week of November. As previously mentioned, this was
also the period in which XII British Corps first came into contact
with 256th Volksgrenadier Division’s main defensive line. Coupled
with the fact the responsibility for the capture of Moerdijk was
transferred to Crocker’s forces, these two formations could have been
gainfully employed within either I British Corps’ or XII Corps’ area
of operations.
For example, while 7th British Armoured Division and 51st (H)
Division reduced the bridgeheads north in the Raamsdonkveer and
Huesden areas, 15th (S) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade
could have struck northwest towards Moerdijk, supporting 1st Polish
Charles B. MacDonald, United States Army in World War II: European Theater
of Operations, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), 245-246.
32  
MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 246.
33  
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Armoured Division. On 28 October, 719th Division withdrew from
Breda to assume command of the Moerdijk bridgehead. Had 15th (S)
Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade attacked towards Moerdijk
with 1st Polish Armoured Division, it is likely they would have
caught 719th Division in the midst of a withdrawal. Their subsequent
destruction and the capture of Moerdijk by these three formations
likely would have shortened operations south of the Maas and led to
additional Fifteenth Army casualties. Another plausible option saw
them supporting the reduction of the bridgehead at Raamsdonkveer
and the destruction of German forces at Geertruidenberg, thus freeing
1st Polish Armoured Division to advance directly on Moerdijk.35 Both
of these actions would have outflanked 256th Volksgrenadier Division’s
defensive line. Given these examples, legitimate tasks remained for
either of these formations. The burden on I British Corps certainly
would have been reduced and may have facilitated the isolation and
destruction of Fifteenth Army. Montgomery’s direct intervention to
transfer these two formations east demonstrates that while he professed
Antwerp as his top priority, his strategic focus remained fixed on the
Ruhr regardless of what his strategic direction indicated.
Crocker and his division commanders would likely have been
surprised at XII British Corps’ methodical advance west and the
reallocation of its formations to support operations not designed
to open Antwerp. Copp identifies that during Montgomery’s visit
to 4th Canadian Armoured Division Headquarters on 25 October,
the concept of trapping Fifteenth Army was abandoned.36 Similarly,
L.F. Ellis indicates that on 27 October Crocker issued orders for I
British Corps’ final drive to the Maas, which included the capture of
Moerdijk.37 XII British Corps’ orders on 27 October also reflect this
change in the concept of operations.38 The re-tasking of the capture
of Moerdijk to I British Corps indicates that clearing Fifteenth Army
south of the Maas, not destroying it, was now the primary objective
of phase three of the operation. Had XII British Corps actually cut off
Fifteenth Army’s withdrawal routes, LXVII Corps likely would have
I British Corps, War Diary and Message Logs, War Diary, 4 November 1944.
Copp, Cinderella Army, 157.
37  
L.F. Ellis, The Defeat of Germany, Vol. II, Victory in the West (London: Her
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1968), 193.
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been limited to two options: be destroyed or surrender. Instead, phase
three transitioned from a combined I and XII British Corps isolate
and destroy operation to I British Corps independently executing a
concerted clearance operation to push back an enemy determined to
delay and fix them for as long as possible.
In examining von Zangen’s strategic plan, it is obvious that
Fifteenth Army had two principal strategic objectives: deny the
Allies the use of Antwerp and fix Allied forces in southern Holland.39
Both of these objectives sought to prevent the Allies from striking
into Germany. Considering these two objectives, the area between
Geertruidenberg and ‘s-Hertogenbosch (XII British Corps’ area of
operations), was not required for von Zangen to successfully execute
his mission. While he was able to fix XII British Corps for a period of
time, this area did little to facilitate the retention of the South Beveland
isthmus or influence Antwerp. Simply put, Fifteenth Army could
lose this area with minimal impact on the accomplishment of their
main effort. In fact, Model had recommended, with von Rundstedt’s
support, that this area be evacuated as early as 24 September in order
to gain the necessary reserves to either secure the Bergen Op Zoom/
Roosendaal/Moerdijk bridgehead or prevent a breakthrough between
Arnhem and Aachen.40 Unsurprisingly, this concept is reflected in von
Zangen’s actions. For Fifteenth Army, its vital ground encompassed
Woensdrecht/Bergen Op Zoom/Roosendaal/Breda/Moerdijk, which
corresponded with I British Corps’ area of operations and the bulk
of von Zangen’s forces. Had Fifteenth Army retained this area, it
would have denied the Allies the use of Antwerp and tied down,
at a minimum, First Canadian Army and potentially elements of
Second British Army. Thus, only through I British Corps’ advance
northwards could von Zangen’s strategy have been undermined and
Fifteenth Army decisively defeated.
The initial thrust of 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke
Force on 20 October, and the subsequent response by von Zangen,
demonstrates the importance of the threat posed by Crocker’s forces.
The continued advance of I British Corps magnified this threat
exponentially. By 27 October, I British Corps was threatening
the newly established Halstren/South Roosendaal/South Breda/
CMHQ, Special Interrogation Report – General Gustav von Zangen, Kardex,
981.065, DHH, 4.
40  
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Alphen line. 4th Canadian Armoured Division had finally cleared
the northern outskirts of Bergen Op Zoom on 28 October, 49th
(WR) Division found itself south of Roosendaal, 104th (US)
Division had captured Zundert in its first combat operation, and 1st
Polish Division prepared to break the stalemate at Alphen. From
this position, Crocker ordered 4th Canadian Armoured Division
to attack towards Steenbergen while 49th (WR) Division cleared
Roosendaal on its right flank. Allen’s division attacked towards
Standdarrbuiten to seize a crossing point over the Mark River at
the same time that 1st Polish Armoured Division captured Breda
and pushed on to Moerdijk.
Opposition was fierce as I British Corps attempted to push the
bulk of Fifteenth Army north of the Maas. Between 28 October and 2
November, 4th Canadian Armoured Division fought a hard campaign
against 85th Division and 6th Para Regiment north of Bergen Op
Zoom and onto Steenbergen. On 3 November, the division entered
the town and the following day forced the Germans to withdraw to
Dinteloord. Following up their success, the division linked up with
elements of the 49th (WR) Division on the outskirts of Dinteloord
and subsequently forced the remaining Germans north of the Maas.41
To the east, 49th (WR) Division successfully captured Roosendaal
on 30 October and continued its advance to the Mark River. Both
49th (WR) Division and 104th (US) Infantry Division successfully
crossed the river on 2 November under heavy fire causing the collapse
of the Mark River defensive line. The Polar Bears then assaulted
towards Willemsted on the Maas, capturing the town on 5 November.
Prior to crossing the river, 104th (US) Division also encountered
a determined German enemy. Capturing Oudenbosch on 30 October,
Allen’s division reached the canal first on 31 October and attempted
a rapid crossing in the hopes of catching the Germans off guard.
Unfortunately, after a two-day battle and heavy casualties, the
division withdrew and reattempted the crossing with 49th (WR)
Division. Having successfully established a bridgehead across the
Mark River on 2 November, Allen’s Timberwolves continued towards
Moerdijk, and assaulted the German bridgehead in cooperation with
1st Polish Armoured Division.
On the right flank of I British Corps, 1st Polish Armoured Division
successfully broke the stalemate at Alphen and captured Breda on
Harrison, CMHQ Report No. 188, 96.
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28 October in cooperation with 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
and Imp Force. The Poles then split into two brigade groups: one
attacking along the I/XII British Corps boundary to Geertruidenberg
and the other towards Moerdijk in a converging attack with 104th
(US) Infantry Division on 8 November. Although the Poles and
Americans successfully cleared the remnants of Fifteenth Army from
south of the Maas, they found the bridge across it had been destroyed
two-days prior.
I British Corps’ attack to the Maas proved to be decisive in the
defeat of Fifteenth Army. O.B. West’s situation report for 29 October
indicated that I British Corps’ operations in Bergen Op Zoom,
Roosendaal, north of Zundert and southeast of Breda threatened to
collapse the front. Within the same situation report, the Germans
indicated that XII British Corps’ attacks had been halted north
of Loon Op Zand and did not threaten the integrity of Fifteenth
Army’s front.42 Later in the day, Model informed von Rundstedt that
Fifteenth Army either had to begin its withdrawal north of the Maas
or fight on to its ultimate destruction.43 While at no time did XII
British Corps force Fifteenth Army to radically alter its front lines,
by 29 October, I British Corps’ operations shifted von Zangen’s main
effort from fixing the Allies in southern Holland to saving what he
could of Fifteenth Army.
Without a sufficient threat within I British Corps’ area of
operations, all indications were that von Zangen would redeploy forces
to counter the threat posed by XII British Corps. In this respect,
Crocker’s actions completely undermined Fifteenth Army’s defensive
strategy. By forcing the redeployment of elements of LXXXVIII Corps
into I British Corps’ area of operations, Crocker not only weakened
LXXXVIII Corps’ position but also fixed these units within LXVII
Corps’ area of operations. Thus, the previous use of “fire department
brigades” to shore up weak points in Fifteenth Army’s defensive line
was rendered untenable. Similarly, the existential threat posed by
I British Corps forced von Zangen to immediately redeploy 245th
Division west. As 256th Volksgrenadier Division was still in the
process of transporting elements of its division from Germany, the
relief in place was conducted with only part of its combat power
O.B. West Situation Report, 29 October 1944, cited in Steiger, AHQ Report #69,
59.
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in position. Without its full combat power by the time the relief in
place was ordered, 256th Volksgrenadier Division lacked the strength
to maintain the previous defensive line held by 245th Division. As
1st Polish Armoured Division’s operations in the vicinity of Breda
threatened to turn their right flank, it forced their withdrawal north,
eventually on an extended defensive line from Dongen to Vught on
25 October.44 This meant, for the first part of XII British Corps’
advance west, it faced only the 59th Division stretched along the
entire front and the 712th Division occupying ‘s-Hertogenbosch. In
large part, this explains why German resistance was minimal until
28 October and why 15th (S) Division faced little opposition when
capturing Tilburg.45 Considering the slow rate of advance by XII
British Corps against two understrength divisions, the addition of a
third likely would have further impeded XII British Corps’ operations
considerably. XII British Corps’ operations were, in reality, supporting
in nature to the decisive operations of I British Corps.
As Crocker’s forces attacked north on 20 October, they gradually
reduced Fifteenth Army’s ability to influence the South Beveland
isthmus and by 24 October had, in conjunction with 2nd Canadian
Division, sealed off the isthmus completely. Although this permitted
II Canadian Corps to execute Operations Vitality and Infatuate,
the clearance of South Beveland and Walcheren Island respectively,
Fifteenth Army still retained the ability to fix Allied forces in the
west. As I British Corps developed subsequent operations north, XII
British Corps’ methodical advance west and the redeployment of 15th
(S) Division and 6th Guards Tank Brigade east left Crocker to face
the bulk of von Zangen’s forces. During the final days of operations
in southern Holland, I British Corps reduced the Bergen Op Zoom/
Roosendaal/Breda/Moerdijk bridgehead and forced Fifteenth Army
to withdraw.46 Having undermined von Zangen’s strategic concept
and pushed his forces north of the Maas, it is evident that I British
Corps was instrumental in achieving Montgomery’s altered phase
three, allowing him to reorient Twenty-First Army Group east.
An analysis of I British Corps’ relationship with II Canadian
Corps is equally important to understand the operational and
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strategic significance of its operations. Regardless of the evident
shortcomings in Montgomery’s overall plan to open the port of
Antwerp, his 16 October directive enabled I British Corps to operate
jointly with 2nd Canadian Division in its efforts to secure the South
Beveland isthmus. I British Corps’ operations, in relation to II
Canadian Corps, have normally been relegated to the margins of
history. However, a careful examination of the facts paints a much
different picture. Instead of executing a simple flank security task,
I British Corps, specifically 4th Canadian Armoured Division and
49th (WR) Division, played a decisive role in securing the isthmus in
partnership with 2nd Canadian Division. More importantly, without I
British Corps’ support, 2nd Canadian Division would likely not have
been able to achieve its objectives within the greater context of First
Canadian Army’s clearance of the Scheldt Estuary. Through this
action, I British Corps set the conditions for II Canadian Corps and
First Canadian Army to achieve operational success and strategic
success within an Allied context.
The importance of the South Beveland isthmus was recognized
by both the Allies and the Germans. Walcheren Island and South
Beveland were connected to the mainland through a narrow isthmus
approximately 25 km north of Antwerp. Whomever controlled the
isthmus, controlled access to the Scheldt. From the German Army’s
perspective, their initial defensive planning assumed that Antwerp
would be retained, thus covering the land approaches into the Scheldt.
By maintaining control over these two areas, any Allied assault
on the Scheldt would have to be amphibious. Compared to a land
based assault, amphibious operations are resource intensive, both in
equipment and training. Thus, any delay in the capture of the Scheldt
facilitated Fifteenth Army’s task to fix Allied forces in southern
Holland. Second British Army’s capture of Antwerp had completely
undermined this strategy. As the Allies threatened to push north of
the city in early September, the possibility existed that they could
have seized the isthmus and launched a land-based assault into South
Beveland. Of course, this came to naught and Second British Army
continued its advance towards Germany, allowing Fifteenth Army
to extricate itself through the Scheldt. Consequently, throughout
September and October 1944, LXVII Corps’ and Fifteenth Army’s
main effort aimed to counter this Allied threat.
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The Allies recognized the requirement for a land based approach
into the Scheldt early in the planning phase of the operation.47
Montgomery first mentioned the use of the isthmus as a route into
South Beveland in a letter to the Commander of First Canadian
Army, Harry Crerar, on 13 September 1944, which outlined his future
plans for the Channel Ports and Antwerp.48 Subsequent Canadian
planning and direction throughout September indicated that both
Crerar and Simonds considered its capture, along with the capture
of Bergen Op Zoom and Roosendaal, as a pre-condition to attacking
South Beveland and Walcheren Island.49 Both Canadian generals
outright rejected a purely amphibious operation to clear the Scheldt
Estuary. With few suitable landing sites on South Beveland and
Walcheren Island, a large-scale amphibious operation would allow
the German fortress commander, Lieutenant General W. Daser, to
concentrate his limited forces at these key sites. Consequently, an
amphibious assault would result in the Allies attacking into wellprepared kill zones with Daser capable of maintaining a tactical
reserve to reinforce threatened landing sites.
Any attempt to launch a waterborne assault across the West
Scheldt, in Crerar’s and Simonds’ estimation, required a concurrent
land-based attack in order to disperse Daser’s forces. Even if a
sufficient number of landing sites did exist, the necessary number
of landing craft and the time required to conduct training did not.50
Given the necessity of the isthmus to First Canadian Army operations,
its successful capture had considerable strategic significance. First
Canadian Army would have to secure the isthmus to attack west,
in conjunction with a more limited amphibious operation in order to
clear the Scheldt and open the port of Antwerp.
To secure the isthmus, Simonds tasked 2nd Canadian Division,
commanded by Major-General R.H. Keefler, to clear the right flank
of II Canadian Corps. Despite the strategic importance of this task,
2nd Canadian Division received negligible support. Relieved by 4th
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Special Service Brigade at Dunkirk, 2nd Canadian Division moved
north to relieve 53rd (W) Division of XII British Corps in the
Antwerp area on 16 September. This allowed First Canadian Army’s
area of operations to shift east relieving XII British Corps along the
Antwerp-Turnhout canal so they could support Operation Market
Garden. Between 18 to 24 September, Keefler’s division successfully
pushed the Germans out of the Antwerp suburb of Merxem northeast
of the city. Leaving 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade to hold their
gains in Antwerp, the remainder of the division pushed east along
the southern edge of the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. After several
unsuccessful attempts to establish a bridgehead, they crossed at 49th
(WR) Division’s bridgehead south of Ryckervosel.51 Emerging from
the bridgehead, they advanced west, capturing St. Leonard on 28
September and Brecht on 1 October. Having cleared the north bank
of the Antwerp-Turnhout canal, 2nd Canadian Division reoriented
north on two axes of advance along the Putte/Woensdrecht road and
the Maria ter Heide/Esschen road. Given the inability of II Canadian
Corps or I British Corps to provide direct support, Keefler and his
division must have felt increasingly isolated.
2nd Canadian Division suffered from Montgomery’s continued
desire to push east into Germany. With I British Corp’s operational
focus consumed by its flank security task, the obstacles to 2nd
Canadian Division’s operations mounted. Between 5 to 16 October, 2nd
Canadian Division fought a vicious campaign against the 70th, 85th,
and 346th Divisions in an attempt to seal off the isthmus and establish
a secure base from which to launch operations into South Beveland.
From 2nd Canadian Division’s perspective, their most challenging
opponent came in the form of 6th Parachute Regiment. Employed
as the vanguard of Lieutenant General Kurt Chill’s 85th Division,
Colonel Frederich von der Heydte, commanded the 6th Parachute
Regiment. Recently arrived from Germany, the regiment consisted of
“twenty-five hundred fanatical and eager young parachutists.52 The
first two battalions of von der Heydte’s regiment arrived in Bergen
Op Zoom on 8 October and engaged in zealous combat against 2nd
Canadian Division until they were forced to withdraw by I British
Corps’ in late October. Battles such as Hoogerheide and Woensdrecht
Harrison, CMHQ Report #188, 48.
CMHQ, Special Interrogation Report –Lieutenant General Erich Diestel, Kardex,
981.065, DHH, 7.
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are recounted as bloody slaughters by both the Canadians and the
Germans.53 Regardless of the deployment of the “elite” 6th Parachute
Regiment, on 16 October O.B. West and Fifteenth Army reported
that the isthmus had been lost and that its recapture was no longer
possible.54 While 2nd Canadian Division managed to sever the link
between 70th Division in South Beveland and LXVII Corps on
the mainland, they lacked the necessary support to attack into the
Scheldt. The real dilemma facing Keefler was if his division could
hold its position, and resist German counter-attacks.
The reality of the situation did not favour the Canadians. 2nd
Canadian Division suffered heavy casualties during its advance north
and the ensuing operations to capture the isthmus. While this left
many of the battalions undermanned, the division’s key leadership
suffered a disproportional number of casualties. Battalion casualties
varied from 5 to 30 per cent from 1 to 16 October, however, when
non-infantry personnel are subtracted from the battalions’ effective
strength, these percentages rise significantly. Take for example, the
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI). Between 16 and 17 October,
their companies reported an average strength of forty-five men.55
After Woensdrecht, the Black Watch fared little better, reporting a
combined effective strength of 379 soldiers in its four rifle companies.
Thus, the regiment’s companies had the effective strength of reinforced
platoons. Officer casualties only exacerbated the situation. Between
1 to 16 October, the RHLI lost twenty of its thirty-five officers while
the South Saskatchewan Regiment lost a staggering thirty of its
thirty-one officers.56
Given the heavy casualties, defensive lines were not continuous
along the battalion/brigade/division front and reconnaissance patrols
could not be conducted due to manpower shortages.57 This denied
2nd Canadian Division units important intelligence gathering
operations and afforded the Germans a certain freedom of manoeuvre
to infiltrate porous defensive positions. While the LXVII Corps’
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situation was as bad or worse, it did not negate the threat they
presented to 2nd Canadian Division. For example, Huijbergen and
south of Bergen Op Zoom were still controlled by 85th Division as
late as 21 October.58 Division intelligence reports reflected this threat,
assessing that LXVII Corps was still capable of influencing their
operations in the Woensdrecht and surrounding area.59 Local attacks
and artillery fire by German forces forces continued, forcing Keefler
to maintain all three of his brigades in a defensive posture unless
they were conducting local offensive operations. Any reorientation
west would have resulted in the destruction of the Canadian division.
In reality both sides had culminated. While the isthmus had
been lost to the Allies on 16 October, the threat the Germans faced
was largely a paper tiger.60 2nd Canadian Division did in fact hold
the isthmus, but they had to maintain their tactical and operational
focus on the immediate German threat, thus preventing them from
consolidating and attacking into South Beveland. The secondary
effect of their operational focus was that First Canadian Army could
not execute its plans for the clearance of the Scheldt. Even with the
isthmus in Canadian possession, von Zangen could still accomplish
his objective of denying Antwerp to the Allies as long as LXVII
Corps posed a threat to 2nd Canadian Division.
Without reinforcements or operations to secure their eastern and
northern flanks, 2nd Canadian Division was essentially fixed. Fifth
Canadian Infantry Brigade’s war diarist summed up the frustrations
of the division quite succinctly: “Cannot understand why they do
not put more troops in the area and finish the job once and for all
instead of playing about shifting first one battalion then another.
This is beginning to look like a winter campaign unless something
breaks soon.”61 Comments like this would have been exactly what
von Zangen wanted to hear as LXVII Corps and Fifteenth Army
continued to pursue operations against the Canadians on the
isthmus. Without the removal of this threat, 2nd Canadian Division
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was unable to achieve Simonds precondition for the assault on the
Scheldt. In Stacey’s words, “Until we could establish a much firmer
grip on the area about the eastern end of the isthmus it was useless
to think of advancing into South Beveland.”62
Nominally, this support was supposed to come from I British
Corps. Crocker’s orders on 8 October directed the Corps to advance
north on 2nd Canadian Division’s right flank to support the capture
of the isthmus and clear all enemy forces south of the Maas. As it
has been previously established, Crocker lacked the necessary combat
power to provide this support. With their flank security task still in
effect, supporting 2nd Canadian Division into South Beveland was
simply impossible. Even if they had sufficient forces, the boundary
between I British Corps and XII British Corps left Bergen Op Zoom
and Steenbergen within 2nd Canadian Division’s area of operations.
A quick map estimate clearly indicates that leaving this area in 2nd
Canadian Division’s area of operations prevented I British Corps from
influencing the battle between Keefler’s division and the German
forces. In addition, the idea that I British Corps was capable of
clearing most of Fifteenth Army south of the Maas was fantastical.
Crocker’s directive was an admission that I British Corps had
effectively lost its ability to conduct determined offensive operations.
The extended front line and lack of manoeuvre units meant that
I British Corps had to “maintain a defensive policy with active
patrolling and local offensive action when and if considered desirable
by Div Comds.”63 Crocker’s paragraph on future tasks painted an
even grimmer picture for the prospects of his corps. Without the
addition of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, anticipated sometime
between 15 and 21 October, he identified that I British Corps
lacked the necessary forces to secure 2nd Canadian Division’s right
flank. Crocker seemed to be at a loss as to what he was expected
to achieve with an infantry and armoured division. Although he
provided timelines for attacks on Tilburg and ‘s−Hertogenbosch,
these operations were directly related to Second British Army’s flank
security. His primary task of clearing German forces south of the
Maas was left to be determined. What is more important in this
context is that 2nd Canadian Division was incapable of achieving its
operational objectives without I British Corps’ support.
Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 386.
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After the resolution of the strategic debate with Eisenhower,
Montgomery’s 16 October directive set the conditions for I British
Corps to isolate the South Beveland isthmus in conjunction with
2nd Canadian Division. Crocker’s eastern boundary, established
on 8 October, shifted west to Poppel/Tilburg and the task of flank
security for Second British Army was removed. More importantly,
First Canadian Army’s inter-corps boundary shifted west along a
the line Capellen/Putte/Hoogerheide and then west to the sea. With
the reduction in Crocker’s area of operations and the shift of the
First Canadian Army inter-corps boundary, I British Corps was now
capable of directly supporting 2nd Canadian Division, given they
received the necessary reinforcements.
The addition of 4th Canadian Armoured Division to I British
Corps partially solved Crocker’s combat strength issue. As previously
mentioned, I British Corps plan consisted of a two division attack
along the right flank of 2nd Canadian Division. Major-General H.W.
Foster, commander of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, planned to
attack two-up with reorganized brigade groups towards Esschen in
Operation Suitcase. In his path lay Lieutenant-General Diestel’s 346th
Division. At the same time, Clarke Force’s Operation Rebound sought
to fix the 711th Division en route to Wuestwezel and provide flank
security to Foster’s division. If successful, 4th Canadian Armoured
Division would attack northwest to Bergen Op Zoom while Clarke
Force maintained flank security. The intent was to either encircle
the German forces threatening 2nd Canadian Division, or force
them to withdraw north. Either scenario saw 2nd Canadian Division
consolidating in the Woensdrecht area and then launching westwards
into South Beveland.
On 20 October, 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade Group and
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group launched from their start
lines near Camp de Brasschaet and Maria ter Heide. Although their
advance was slow, more due to mines, obstacles, and booby traps
than enemy contact, initial gains reduced 2nd Canadian Division’s
extended right flank and elements of the two divisions managed
to link up in Vossenburg.64 The following day, both brigade groups
advanced to the Roosendaal Canal, and despite heavy resistance
at times, penetrated deep into 346th Division’s lines. Brigadier R.
Moncel’s forces even managed to deploy infantry units across the
I British Corps, War Diary, 20 October 1944.
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canal to establish a bridgehead while his armour provided left flank
security. At the same time, Clarke Force pushed 711th Division out
of Wuestwezel, causing the previously discussed threat to LXVII
Corps’ centre.
By the early morning of 22 October, Esschen was captured by
Brigadier J.C. Jefferson’s Brigade Group, allowing the division to
eliminate pockets of bypassed enemy in their rear areas. Over 450
Germans surrendered, leading the war diarist to surmise, “their tails
are up.”65 Meanwhile, Clarke Force had defeated the attack by 245th
Division, pushing them north between Zundert and Wuestwezel.
Although I British Corps achieved considerable success to this point,
LXVII Corps still exerted considerable influence in the area. 70th
Division threatened 2nd Canadian Division from the isthmus and
85th Division and 346th Division still occupied their northern and
eastern flank.
The continued push towards Esschen and later Bergen Op Zoom
had a decisive impact on 2nd Canadian Division and the German
units opposing them. Elements of 6th Parachute Regiment and selfpropelled guns from 85th Division redeployed from the Woensdrecht
area to support 346th Division’s attempts to halt 4th Canadian
Armoured Division’s advance. Despite weakening the forces facing
2nd Canadian Division, the threat posed by 4th Canadian Armoured
Division’s advance left von Zangen with few options. As he lacked
an operational reserve he could only move units from other parts of
Fifteenth Army’s defensive line. Another key indication of the effect
of Foster’s attack was the redeployment of German artillery into two
central locations on the Canadian frontage.66 While German artillery
continued to engage 2nd Canadian Division, it was now also tasked
to fire missions to counter the advance of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division. Obviously this meant that German units facing Keefler’s
division lost a measure of their fire support capability. At this point,
the German commanders likely feared imminent encirclement by 2nd
Canadian and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions.
Despite this early success, 2nd Canadian Division’s intelligence
reported, “any assessment of str[ength] on our immediate front

4th Canadian Armoured Division, General Staff War Diary, 22 October 1944.
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facing north is difficult and unreliable.”67 Further, their intelligence
assessed, “The enemy intends to hold firmly where he stands and will
oppose at any cost every effort made by us to seal off completely the
South Beveland isthmus.”68 Even with elements of 85th and 346th
Divisions, and the entire 245th Division being drawn away from 2nd
Canadian Division by I British Corps, lacked the combat power to
independently isolate the isthmus. Keefler needed Foster to position
4th Canadian Division between him and LXVII Corps forces to
protect his rear and flank areas as he attacked west.
On the night of 22 October, Moncel and Foster planned to exploit
the Division’s success in Esschen by advancing northwest towards
Bergen Op Zoom. With this action, they hoped that they would
finally force both Chill and Diestel to either fight to the bitter end
encircled by Canadians, or withdraw north, ceding the isthmus to
the Canadians. Neither option was likely acceptable to Sponheimer or
von Zangen, but they were quickly running out of time and options.
Advancing northwest on 23 to 24 October, Moncel’s Brigade
Group ran into Chill’s forces on the Wouwsche Plantage. While Chill
had been focused on 2nd Canadian Division, Moncel’s advance on his
left flank once again forced him to reorient part of his forces to face
the impending threat. The continual sapping of German forces from
their positions in the Woensdrecht area by 4th Canadian Armoured
Division allowed Keefler to expand and solidify his position on the
isthmus.69 Despite inflicting heavy casualties on Chill’s forces, 4th
Canadian Armoured Brigade Group failed to eject them from the
Wouwsche Plantage.70 While nominally a setback, it still diverted
Chill’s operational focus from 2nd Canadian Division. To increase
the pressure on Chill’s forces, Jefferson’s Brigade Group attacked
from Huijbergen on 25 October, having captured the town in a joint
effort with 2nd Canadian Division and 29th Canadian Armoured
Reconnaissance Regiment the day prior.
Heavy fighting continued on 26 October, but the following
day Moncel’s Brigade Group ejected the 85th Division from the
Wouwsche Plantage and advanced further north to Wouwsche
2nd Canadian Infantry Division, General Staff War Diary, 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Int.
Summary No. 14 for the period of 222400AOct44.
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Hil. For Jefferson’s part, as he advanced west towards Bergen Op
Zoom, German resistance dissolved as the 85th and 346th Divisions
withdrew north to escape encirclement. Von Zangen decided to save
what he could of Fifteenth Army instead of sacrificing them in the
Scheldt. Late in the day, 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance
Regiment reported Bergen Op Zoom clear of German forces. At this
point, the South Beveland isthmus could now be deemed secured by
both 2nd Canadian Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division.
When I British Corps’ operational success is put into the context
of 2nd Canadian Division’s and First Canadian Army’s operations,
it is evident that they were much more than a supporting operation.
The earliest example of this was I British Corps’ ability to draw
245th Division away from its intended task. Clarke Force’s successful
occupation of Wuestwezel prevented the reinforcement of 85th and
346th Divisions in the Woensdrecht area. This enabled 2nd Canadian
Division to retain and expand its footprint on the isthmus. Had
245th Division successfully reinforced the German forces facing 2nd
Canadian Division, it may have resulted in their decisive defeat and
potential destruction. This suggests a linkage between the operational
success of I British Corps and 2nd Canadian Division.
Similarly with Bergen Op Zoom captured, 4th Canadian
Division interposed itself between Keefler’s forces and Sponheimer’s
divisions, effectively securing their eastern and northern flanks. The
elimination of this threat enabled 2nd Canadian Division to reorient
their brigades west and advance into South Beveland. A better way
to define this action is as a cordon operation. While 2nd Canadian
Division may have formed the inner cordon on the South Beveland
isthmus, 4th Canadian Armoured Division and I British Corps
provided the solid outer cordon that pushed back and defeated the
external threat. In essence, the efforts to secure the South Beveland
isthmus became a joint operation between the two divisions, not 4th
Canadian Armoured Division or I British Corps in a supporting role.
Again, this is a clear indication of I British Corps directly influencing
2nd Canadian Division’s ability to execute its operational tasks.
Surprisingly, this reliance on 4th Canadian Armoured Division
has been recounted as a failure by 2nd Canadian Division in the
official history. Stacey states, “Anticipating relief from embarrassment
on its right by the advance of the 1st Corps under Montgomery’s new
policy, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was able on 23 October
to begin the final clearing of the Woensdrecht area preparatory to
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operations against South Beveland.”71 The evidence does not support
Stacey’s assessment. The division fought a difficult and bloody
battle, with little support, from the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal to the
South Beveland isthmus. In the process of fighting elements of three
separate divisions and an alleged “elite” parachute regiment, they
suffered heavy casualties, particularly amongst the division’s officers
and senior non-commissioned officers. A more accurate account of
2nd Canadian Division’s performance comes from von der Heydte:
“The Canadians—I say that as a German—fought brilliantly: to the
rank of Brigadier, the officers stood side by side with their men on the
front lines.”72 If anything, their inability to secure their objective was
a reflection of the tactical and operational reality of Montgomery’s
disconnected pre-16 October strategy. That being said, without
I British Corps, 2nd Canadian Division would have continued to
exhaust itself in attempts to accomplish an impossible task.
Operationally, the isolation of the South Beveland isthmus was
one of First Canadian Army’s preconditions to executing Operations
Vitality and Infatuate. Thus, the operations of I British Corps between
20 to 26 October can be directly linked to Allied strategic success.
By securing 2nd Canadian Division’s eastern and northern flanks, I
British Corps set into motion a series of operational actions that led
to the opening of the port of Antwerp. With Simonds’ precondition of
securing the South Beveland isthmus met, he was able to launch both
2nd Canadian Division and 52nd (L) Division into South Beveland
to execute Operation Vitality. Once complete, 4th Special Service
Brigade executed Operation Infatuate onto Walcheren Island. The
end result of these operations is well-known and led to the liberation
of the Scheldt Estuary from German control. What is not recognized
is that the successful realization of Allied strategy hinged on, and
was made possible by, the actions of I British Corps.
Friendly casualty rates are a strong indicator of the determination
of an enemy in defensive operations. High casualty rates tend indicate
a well-led and determined enemy, while low casualty rates normally
are indicative of the opposite. In the weeks leading up to I British
Corps’ advance to the Maas, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions suffered
crippling casualties during their operations to the South Beveland
Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 391.
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isthmus and in the Breskens Pocket respectively. Between 2 to 19
October, 2nd Canadian Division suffered 1,460 killed and wounded
with an average of 81.1 casualties per day.73 3rd Canadian Division,
arriving at the Breskens Pocket on 6 October, fared no better and
suffered 1,213 killed and wounded between 6 to 19 October. This
equated to an average rate of 86.6 casualties per day.74
However, these statistics need to be put into context in order
to understand why they were so high. As 2nd Canadian Division
advanced to the South Beveland isthmus, they did so without
the benefit of support from II Canadian or I British Corps. As a
result, the division found itself fighting elements of three German
divisions focused exclusively on its destruction. However, as 4th
Canadian Armoured Division advanced along its right flank, their
daily casualty rate dropped by 34 per cent to 53.67 casualties per
day.75 This suggests that 2nd Canadian Division’s daily casualty rate
between 2 to 19 October would have been lower had I British Corps
advance in a mutually supporting role during this period.
Within the Breskens Pocket, 3rd Canadian Division fought in
restrictive terrain, which greatly facilitated German defensive operations.
In fact, during the period of 6 to 19 October, 3rd Canadian Division
suffered 65.5 per cent of their casualties in a six-day window during
its assault across the Leopold Canal and the amphibious operation
at Braakman.76 The daily casualty rate during this period was 132.5
compared to 52.25 during the remaining eight days.77 While German
forces within the Breskens Pocket have long been considered to have
mounted a formidable defence, these numbers suggest that terrain was
a determinant factor in their ability to defend within the pocket.
Undoubtedly, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions faced a determined
and motivated enemy, but how do I British Corps casualty statistics
compare? Did I British Corps face a defeated enemy racing to cross the
Maas to safety or an enemy determined to delay and fix them as long
as possible? 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s war diary certainly
indicates that it faced strong German resistance during their advance
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to the Maas. Similarly, Stacey, Ellis, and MacDonald provide several
examples of fierce combat in their respective official histories.
Casualty statistics support these claims. During the period
of 20 October to 8 November, three of the four divisions within I
British Corps suffered higher casualties than 2nd and 3rd Canadian
Divisions. In particular, 104th (US) Infantry Division averaged 77.25
casualties per day after it entered the line on 23 October.78 In total,
they suffered 1,236 killed or wounded, which was over 400 more
casualties than 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions. Although reports
indicate a determined German opposition, the higher casualty rates
within 104th (US) Infantry Division may also have been due to the
manner in which Allen fought his division. Regardless, both 4th
Canadian Armoured Division and 49th (WR) Division have slightly
higher casualty rates than 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions.
Brigade casualties follow the same trend as their higher
headquarters. I British Corps brigades had the highest four casualty
rates within First Canadian Army during this period. Indicative of
the determined resistance faced by 4th Canadian Armoured Division,
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade suffered the highest daily casualty
rate within the corps, with an average of 26.9. This totalled 538
killed or wounded, which was more than double the total of five of
the six infantry brigades within 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions.79
Both division and brigade statistics suggest that as I British Corps
advanced to the Maas, it fought an enemy that was as or more
determined than the German forces facing 2nd and 3rd Canadian
Divisions. It is unlikely that Fifteenth Army would have withdrawn
across the Maas had Crocker’s forces not executed a determined and
decisive assault. It is clear that the operations of I British Corps in
October and November 1944 were a critical part of the operational
and strategic success of II Canadian Corps, First Canadian Army,
Twenty-First Army Group, and possibly the Allied war effort.
This paper has demonstrated that I British Corps’ operations
were critical to the operational and strategic success of Allied
operations to open the port of Antwerp. As Crocker’s forces began
their advance, they represented an existential threat to LXVII Corps
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and Fifteenth Army as a whole. Recognizing this, von Zangen was
forced to redeploy and maintain forces within I British Corps’ area
of operations to prevent the collapse of his army’s defensive line. As
Crocker fixed formations on his front, it prevented the much needed
reinforcement of German forces facing 2nd Canadian Division and
XII British Corps, thus undermining von Zangen’s strategic plan to
retain the South Beveland isthmus and deny the port of Antwerp
to the Allies. Clearly, Crocker’s actions undermined von Zangen’s
and the German Army’s ability to achieve operational and strategic
success.
As 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Clarke Force secured
the northern and eastern flank of 2nd Canadian Division, it enabled
the execution of First Canadian Army’s plan to clear the Scheldt
and eventually open Antwerp as a logistical hub for the Allied forces.
Operational success on the part of I British Corps was directly
responsible for the operational success of II Canadian Corps and
the strategic victory of First Canadian Army. Without I British
Corps successfully completing its operational tasks, the clearance of
the Scheldt Estuary and the opening of the port of Antwerp would
have been considerably delayed. Regardless of I British Corps’ status
within the historiography of the Battle of the Scheldt, Crocker, and
the action of his forces, deserve to be recognized for the decisive
victory they achieved in October and November of 1944.
◆

◆

◆

◆

about the author
Major Nicholas Wheeler has served in the Canadian Armed Forces for over
20 years in a variety of leadership and staff officer positions, both domestically
and internationally. His academic interests include military strategy, Canada
in the First and Second World War, and insurgency/counter-insurgency
warfare. He is currently posted to the Royal Military College where he is
completing his PhD in War Studies under Dr. Douglas Delaney

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

37

